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ABSTRACT
Lithium is becoming an important resource in the world economy. 
An increasing number of products require the metal, ranging from 
laptops to hybrid vehicles. While a number of countries contain deposits, 
Bolivia has over 50% of the world’s reserves. As international interest 
grows, so are economic incentives to export the commodity. Although 
this subject has attracted scant scholarly research, the development of 
lithium reserves raises fundamental research questions that are both 
academically important and policy relevant. First, lacking the capacity 
to develop the reserves, the Bolivian government has actually bypassed 
U.S. corporations, its traditional partners, to seek assistance from South 
Korea. Although most research has focused on China’s inroads into 
Latin America, what does this new source of foreign direct investment 
mean for the country’s development? Second, there has been a growing 
body of literature questioning the positive externalities of export-led 
growth. Will Bolivia be able to benefit from the exportation of lithium? 
In addition to addressing these questions, this paper aims to: 1) Discuss 
the specific challenges an impoverished country like Bolivia faces; 2) 
analyze previous failures with the export-led development model; and 
3) advance policies on how Bolivia will be able to benefit from the 
development and exportation of its lithium reserves.
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INTRODUCTION
Lithium is quickly becoming an important resource in the world economy. 
While a number of countries such as Chile and China contain deposits, 
Bolivia has the largest reserves. With over 50% of the world’s deposits, 
the country has been called, according to one governmental study, “The 
Saudi Arabia of lithium” (Ríos Roca 2009). As international interest in 
lithium grows, so too will the desire to mine and export the resource. 
In fact, lithium is required to produce the electric car, which is pivotal 
in decreasing the world’s dependency on fossil fuels. As more companies 
produce these vehicles, and as their popularity grows, the demand for 
lithium, the key component in the car batteries, will as well. Currently, 
lithium is already utilized in numerous products, primarily consumer 
electronics such as laptops and mobile phones. The amounts used for 
these devices, however, are comparatively small, while the amount of 
lithium required for a car battery can reach to thirty kilos (Haddock 
2010). Nonetheless, the recent demand for lithium has increased the price 
of the commodity tremendously. As of March 2010, the price of lithium 
stood at approximately $3,000 a ton, up from $350 per ton five years 
before (Ibid).
As a result, the study of lithium needs to be explored. There has been 
little scholarly research, however, on this topic. Even a recent World 
Bank (2009) country study on Bolivia’s export competitiveness failed to 
mention the pivotal economic role of lithium. The development of lithium 
reserves, however, raises important questions related to Bolivia’s ability 
to both secure crucial foreign direct investment (FDI) and benefit from 
the export-led growth model as a developmental strategy. These questions 
have value for both academic and policy research. The first question 
relates to Bolivia’s own recognition that the country lacks both the 
infrastructural and investment capacity to develop and then export lithium 
deposits. Recognizing the necessity of investment, Bolivia has already 
decided to bypass the United States, its traditional source of foreign 
investment, and has successfully courted funding from an unusual player: 
South Korea. How will this new source of investment benefit Bolivia’s 
ambitious lithium development plans? Second, there is a growing body 
of influential literature that questions the positive externalities of export-led 
growth. Will Bolivia even be able to benefit from the resource? In addition 
to addressing these pressing questions, this paper aims to: 1) Discuss 
the individual challenges Bolivia faces as an impoverished nation-state; 
2) analyze previous failures with export-led development; and, most 
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importantly, 3) advance concrete policies on how the country can best 
extract benefits from its vast lithium reserves.
METHODOLOGY
This paper is an exploratory study. Relying on a single case study approach, 
its aim is to create a research framework to understand the conditions 
under which Bolivia may or may not benefit from the development and 
exportation of lithium reserves, as well as the new pivotal role Asian 
investment aims to play. Although social scientists often question the 
value of single case studies and inductive exploratory research, a number 
of scholars have begun to observe the importance of in-depth case studies. 
They can serve as a useful methodological tool for offering insight into 
outlier cases, exploring causal inferences, and being research generating. 
John Gerring, upon whose methodological work we build, stresses the 
vital, yet often overlooked value of case studies. Gerring (2004) points 
out that exploratory and inductive research is instrumental for theory 
development and “path-breaking” findings; it is not merely for confirmation 
and falsification (349). The type of exploratory study Gerring describes 
relies on an in-depth analysis of a particular case, but draws upon periphery 
cases for comparative insight. In the particular research here, we focus 
on Bolivia, but draw upon lessons of resource extraction from a diversity 
of cases, including Chile, Venezuela, and even Alaska.
More importantly, analyzing a specific contextual environment has 
become valuable in developmental economics. Recognizing the failure 
of one-size-fits-all economic policies, influential economists such as Dani 
Rodrik (1999; 2007a; 2007b) and Joseph Stiglitz (2002) have stressed 
the need for country-based recommendations. Although Rodrik (2007a) 
observes that large-n studies still offer valuable insight into developmental 
policies, he concedes, “growth-promoting policies tend to be context 
specific” (15). What is more, stressing the importance of the contextual 
environment is not limited to economic growth strategies. Rodrik (2007a) 
continues to point out that economic and political institutions are often 
context-specific, depending on the culture and historical contingencies 
of particular nations. 
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BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BOLIVIA
An exploratory case study suites Bolivia due to the country’s differences 
it has with other Latin American nation-states. Being the only landlocked 
country besides Paraguay in the Americas, Bolivia depends on the whim 
of its neighbors for access to ports. For exports, most of the country’s 
commodities go through Chilean ports, the same country to which Bolivia 
lost its sea access as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). 
This poses a particular challenge for not only Bolivia’s development, but 
also certain constraints for the development of lithium reserves. Although 
precise measurements are difficult, studies suggest that the lack of the 
efficient use of ports significantly decreases a country’s economic indicators 
and increases transportation costs often resulting, in the case of Bolivia, 
in similar high costs for international and intraregional trade (World 
Development Report 2009). 
Bolivia also faces a number of other challenges. The country remains 
an extremely impoverished nation relative to its neighbors. According 
to the World Bank (2011), its annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
continues to be roughly $24 billion, far below the other Andean states. 
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia enjoy GDPs at $66 billion, 
$177 billion, $317 billion, and $332 billion, respectively (World Bank 2011). 
Although Bolivia has experienced recent booms in commodity exportation, 
the country’s exports have an extremely low added value, relying principally 
on primary goods. A World Bank study suggests that Bolivia had one 
of the world’s lowest manufactured and high-technological percentages 
of overall exports, standing at 7% and 4% respectively (World Development 
Report 2009, 358). What is more, even in times of export booms, the 
country’s economy, dependent on primary products, is vulnerable to severe 
busts. For example, after significant economic growth throughout the 
current decade, exportation value plummeted in 2009 by 23.2%, equaling 
$5.3 billion (“Bolivia Overview” 2009). This boom-bust cycle has been 
pernicious and well-documented in countries such as Bolivia, which 
experienced a tin bust, the country’s most important commodity, in 1985.1 
Land concentration, as in other Latin American countries, is also a problem. 
A study by the Catholic Church in Bolivia revealed that 50,000 families 
owned roughly 90% of the country’s productive land (Kahya 2006). Finally, 
the country ranks poorly in areas of transparency and corruption. 
 1 For an in-depth understanding of Bolivia’s commodity curse, see Schultz and Draper 
(2008).
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Transparency International’s Corruption Index (2010) gave Bolivia 2.5 
out of a 10 point score, the lowest transparency in the region only after 
Paraguay, which received 2.2.2
Moreover, the lithium reserves are not located in an accessible area 
of the country. The deposits are concentrated in Salar de Uyuni, the 
southwestern part of the country. Currently, Bolivia’s sole extraction project 
is reachable only by dirt road two hours from the nearest town. Additionally, 
the climate in the area is extremely inhospitable, making extraction more 
difficult. The reality of being an impoverished landlocked country also 
compounds the problems of not only mining the soft metal, but actually 
processing and exporting it.
It is also important to note that Bolivia has a sizable indigenous population. 
Up to 62.5% of the 8 million Bolivians are indigenous. Quechua is the 
largest group at 32% of the indigenous population followed by Aymaras 
at 25% (Van Cott 2008). Bolivia’s indigenous population is important 
because many face prejudices, social and economic barriers, linguistic 
exclusion, and geographical isolation. As a result, even after the election 
of Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales (2006–present), many 
remain mired in poverty and participate in social unrest in order to voice 
their needs. As we suggest later, lithium reserves could address not only 
indigenous discrimination, but also a number of the issues mentioned 
above. 
The current government, however, has made efforts to address some 
of these concerns. Although an in-depth analysis of President Evo Morales’ 
leftist politics, which is often an ideologically contentious subject, is outside 
the scope of this paper, the government has made successful attempts 
to improve the country’s indicators. For example, albeit still low, economic 
growth has improved. The country’s gross national product (GDP) has 
doubled during this decade (World Bank 2011). The economic increase 
has, to a certain extent, trickled down to the vast population living in 
poverty; there have been significant decreases in the percentages of Bolivians 
living under the poverty line. According to the United Nations (2010), 
the percentage went from 65.2% in 2002 to 37.7% in 2007. The government 
has also decreased its external debt from $4.568 billion in 2005 to $2.544 
billion in 2009 (“External Debt Shocks” 2011). In fact, the reduction 
of debt took place while there was a twofold increase in GDP growth 
between 2000 and 2009 (World Bank 2011).
The specific policies aimed at improving the country’s indicators have 
 2 For transparency International, 10 is the “cleanest”, whereas as 0 is highly corrupt. 
See “Corruptions Perceptions Index 2010 Results” for more information.
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been different from the president’s predecessors and, at times, quite creative. 
In order to reduce poverty, for example, the government floated bonds, 
la Renta Dignidad and el Bono Juancito Pinto, in order to assist school children 
and retirees. Public investment has also increased by roughly 70% compared 
to the first half of this decade (“La pobreza es aún es alta” 2009). Additionally, 
the Morales Administration has also outlined and implemented policies 
to assist exporters who might have difficulty exporting to countries due 
to lack of capital or high entry barriers. One policy actually helps pay 
the tariffs exporters face to countries such as the United States (“Tres 
Decretos” 2009). The government has also diversified the country’s options 
for exportation and foreign direct investment (FDI) by bypassing traditional 
partners in the United States and Europe and making relations with countries 
as diverse as Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, China, and South Korea. This type 
of economic diversification and policies, albeit discouraged by more 
traditional economists and policy makers, most of whom are from the 
United States, may help the country benefit from its lithium reserves. 
BOLIVIA, THE NATIONALIZATION OF 
RESOURCES, AND SOUTH KOREAN FDI
With export-led growth in doubt, one central question emerges: Will 
Bolivia benefit from the commodity? To rely on economist Charles 
Kindleberger’s famous answer, “it depends”. The first challenge is attracting 
foreign direct investment. The Bolivian government has conceded that 
FDI is instrumental for developing lithium reserves. In 2006, however, 
Morales carried out a large number of nationalizations that upset a number 
of private corporations from origins ranging from Brazil and Argentina 
to France and Spain. The nationalizations initially focused on the operation 
and production of Bolivian hydrocarbons, reversing the years of 
privatization, or what the Bolivians call “capitalization”. Capitalization 
was carried out by previous president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 
1994 with the Capitalization Law and 1996 with the Hydrocarbons Law 
(Vargas 2007). These laws essentially allowed private investment to purchase 
the operations of the gas resources with the state earning a percentage 
of the royalties. Although the wave of privatization was supported by 
the international community, particularly the United States, it proved 
unpopular in the country, predominantly with marginalized indigenous 
groups, galvanizing a backlash that led to a 2004 referendum favoring 
a nationalization of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) 
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(Ibid). When Morales became president in 2006, he supported and carried 
out the nationalization of not only YPFB, but other privatized entities 
such as ENTEL, the Bolivian Telecommunications Company. The wave 
of nationalizations sparked protests from not only European and North 
American companies, but South American businesses as well, including 
those from Peru, Argentina, and Brazil (“CLHB será YPFB” 2006; “Petrobas 
Amenaza” 2006). In fact, Bolivia is the only country to have formerly 
withdrawn from the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
Morales has made clear, however, that it does not need to depend 
on U.S., European, or even South American capital for investment 
opportunities. As other developing countries, Bolivia has recently looked 
toward Asia for such opportunities. This new move for developing countries 
to find capital from Asian investors has attracted a large body of academic 
and policy literature. Most of the focus, however, has naturally become 
dominated by the pivotal role of China (Hearn and León Manríquez 
2011; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010; Santiso 2007). China’s involvement 
in Latin American countries (LAC) has increased significantly. By 2010, 
China had become a more prominent investor loaner in LAC than the 
World Bank, totaling up to $37 billion (Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski 
2012). Foreign direct investment has increased significantly as well. 
According to a study by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), investment from China has 
reached over $113 billion when less than a decade ago the amount stood 
at less than $5 billion (Foreign direct Investment 2011). 
China’s inroads into developing countries have inevitably pushed scholars 
to weigh the benefits and costs these nations will face. On the one hand, 
a number of researchers have found negative trends with China-Latin 
America relations, emphasizing the nature of the investment. Gallagher 
and Porzecanski (2010), for example, fear that China’s focus on natural 
resources will further create dependency on specific raw commodities 
and hinder the region’s ability to diversify its economy. Others, however, 
have noted China’s role for fueling economic growth and avoiding recession. 
Former Brazilian President Lula de Silva praised China’s initiatives, noting 
that Brazil, where China has funneled the bulk of its investment, has 
become an instrumental economic partner (Ferchen 2012). 
Unlike other Latin American countries, however, Bolivia has attracted 
investment interests not from China, but South Korea to fuel lithium 
development. Bolivia has recently entered into a number of agreements 
with the government to not only develop the reserves, but the infrastructure 
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surrounding the sites as well. Mutual interest between South Korea and 
Latin America is relatively new. “Until very recently”, Juan Felipe López 
(2012) points out, “there was little public attention on Korea in Latin 
America” (3). Although China has significantly increased its presence in 
the region, South Korea’s share of trade in Latin America and the Caribbean 
stands at only 2.5% (Mesquita Moreira 2011). What is more, Korea has 
channeled more than half its investment into Brazil, particularly due to 
the investment of Hyundai Motor Company, Korea’s largest auto 
manufacturer, which has invested up to $600 million in new automaker 
plants (Ibid). 
South Korea’s investment initiatives in Bolivia’s lithium projects, however, 
are significant. Bolivia’s Comibol and the Korea Resources Corporation 
(Kores), both state enterprises, initially entered into agreements that stressed 
both the extraction and processing of lithium metals (Eun-Joo 2010). 
This initial joint venture has led to a consortium of investors in which 
POSCO, the largest steelmaker in Korea, and a number of smaller Korean 
companies have invested in the lithium project (Dyson 2012). Under 
the agreement, which concentrates on the vast lithium reserves in Salar 
de Uyuni, Comibol will have a 50% stake in the project while the Korean 
consortium will own the other half (Ibid). Both countries will contribute 
$1.5 million each for the initial investment necessary for the start-up 
project. The overall objective of the joint venture between the two countries 
is to process and produce up to five hundred tons of the finished products 
annually (Imaña 2012). According to Luis Alberto Echazú, a key Bolivian 
figure who is managing the lithium extraction for Comibol, the finished 
products, which will take place in the third “phase” of investment and 
production, will consist of lithium-ion batteries, cathodes, and electrolytes 
(Dyson 2012). Cathodes can be particularly lucrative on the international 
market. Vehicles that rely upon electric rechargeable batteries depend 
on them (“S. Korea, Bolivia, set up” 2012). South Korea further advanced 
concrete agreements to finance infrastructural projects such as bridges 
with low-interest loans (“Cuatro puentes” 2010). This finance is of great 
importance since the geographical areas that contain lithium deposits have 
little infrastructural development.
In addition to an investment consortium, South Korea aims to assist 
Bolivia in both technological and scientific development. This type of 
development is as crucial as foreign investment and loans. Bolivia has 
very little experience extracting and processing lithium metals. Although 
Korean representatives have stressed their faith in Bolivia’s contribution 
to lithium extraction, on-the-ground experts recognize Bolivia’s lack of 
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knowledge and technical skills in the complex process. Juan Carlos Zulate, 
Bolivian economist and expert in lithium, has publically conceded that 
the government has almost no experience with exploring, extracting, and 
processing lithium, particularly in Salar de Uyuni, which has harsh climate 
conditions (cited in Dyson 2012). As a result, Korean technicians, engineers, 
and mining experts have begun working with their Bolivian counterparts 
on technological development. In fact, a group of Korean experts recognized 
that conventional extracting and processing techniques commonly employed 
in Bolivia would not be appropriate for the difficult conditions in Salar 
de Uyuni. The researchers, two of whom work for Korea Resources 
Corp, recently published their results on a more sophisticated hydrometallurgical 
process that would recover Bolivian lithium from brine extracted from 
Salar de Uyuni. According to the study, high levels of sulphate and 
magnesium in the brine render conventional techniques inappropriate; 
the researchers have, therefore, developed a technical plan to produce 
a high purity of lithium carbonate (see Woong An et al. 2012). 
EXPORT-LED GROWTH: 
THE OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL?
Despite extensive foreign assistance and enthusiasm for lithium 
development, however, the export-led growth model for developing 
countries has come under attack in recent years. Even if Bolivia is able 
to attract stable and consistent FDI from South Korea, as well as 
technological development, the country’s ability to benefit from lithium 
could be severely limited. One of the most prominent critics of the export-led 
model is Harvard economist Dani Rodrik. Rodrik has challenged global 
trade enthusiasts such as Jeffrey Sachs, who has touted the benefits of 
export trade. Rodrik (1999) observes that this “export fetish” in 
developmental policy decision making often fails to create not only 
sustainable growth, but also positive economic externalities for the particular 
country implementing export-led strategies. Although space constraints 
do not allow an in-depth analysis of this crucial debate, Rodrik (1999) 
stresses that increased exportation does not necessarily: 1) serve as the 
catalyst and causation behind more productive, efficient, and technological 
industries; 2) lead to spin off industries and more technologically advanced 
jobs; and 3) create greater export diversity. In fact, Rodrik (2007b) continues 
to point out that many policy makers are inattentive to the potential 
problems, often known as the “natural resource curse”, with the exportation 
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of natural resources (2). Potential problems can range from primary product 
dependency and “Dutch disease” to even the deterioration of democratic 
institutions. With lithium being a natural reserve for exportation, there 
are inevitable challenges for the Bolivian economy. 
POTENTIAL PITFALLS: DUTCH DISEASE
Although this is not a comprehensive list, there are three very possible 
negative externalities that can accompany lithium extraction: Dutch disease, 
primary commodity dependency, and the temptation to utilize the 
concomitant lithium revenues to undermine democratic rule. The first 
negative externality, Dutch disease, is a common economic phenomenon 
that Bolivian policy makers will have to address. In economic theory, 
Dutch disease is related to Tadeusz Rybczynski’s path-breaking work on 
uneven growth. Although space constraints do not allow an in-depth 
review of the Rybczynski Theorem and its relation with the Heckscher-Ohlin 
Model, a brief overview of the causes behind Dutch disease is warranted.3
Economists predict that with the opening of trade, countries will produce 
and export the products for which they have factor abundance and import 
those for which they have factor scarcity. On opening up to foreign 
trade, China, for instance, would be inclined to export labor-intensive 
products and import, due to country’s scarcity in arable land, agricultural 
and mineral goods. Economists observe that this is exactly the path on 
which China has developed (Pugel 2004). In fact, not only has China 
exported labor-intensive products, but the country’s insatiable importation 
of agricultural and mineral products has fueled the export boom in a 
number of Latin American countries (see Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010). 
On the other hand, the United States has become a primary exporter 
of skilled labor-intensive products attributable to the country’s large pool 
of highly skilled labor. However, Rybczynski (1955) observed that under 
certain conditions, the development of one product can retard the growth 
of another, leading to uneven development. When the Dutch, after whom 
Dutch disease is named, discovered large natural gas reserves in the in 
the North Sea in 1959, Holland experienced a significant production decrease 
in its manufacturing sector. Drilling and exporting the resource caused 
varying degrees of positive and negative consequences. As the Economist 
 3 For a substantial discussion on international trade, factor production, and the 
Hecksher-Ohlin Model see Baldwin (2008).
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noticed, the country experienced “external health and internal ailment”: 
the current account remained with a surplus, but the productive domestic 
sectors suffered (“The Dutch Disease” 1977). Economists building upon 
Rybczynski’s research found that the factors of production went from 
being invested in the manufacturing sector to being funneled into the 
lucrative production of natural gas (Kapler 2006). This factor of production 
movement began to lead to the de-industrialization of the Netherlands.
In addition to the movement of the factors of production, a country’s 
currency plays a pivotal role in potential Dutch disease. A currency’s 
value, as with that of any commodity on the open market, is susceptible 
to appreciations and depreciations depending on its international demand. 
When a country exports a commodity in high demand, such as oil or 
natural gas, the country’s currency inevitably becomes in demand. This 
often leads to an overly appreciated currency, causing the country’s other 
internationally traded products such as textiles and manufactured goods 
to be overpriced and, thus, not competitive. What is more, and overvalued 
currency also leads to higher inflation, something that many large oil 
producers such as Venezuela and Nigeria have historically suffered. 
Dutch disease is a serious threat for Bolivia. First, albeit Bolivia is 
initially counting on direct foreign investment (FDI), governmental and 
domestic investment is essential for the development and exportation 
of the resource. President Morales sees a pivotal role for the state in 
the development and exportation of the country’s natural reserves. 
Therefore, considerable public and private Bolivian resources will be 
funneled into the project. Bolivian policy makers must make sure that 
the movement of production factors does not significantly decrease the 
production of competing economic sectors. 
More importantly, if lithium becomes a highly demanded commodity 
as the international business community predicts, the Bolivian government 
must be prepared to address the inevitable problem of currency 
overvaluation. The concomitant appreciation of the boliviano can have 
serious negative repercussions throughout the economy. First, it can lead 
to inflation. The current government has managed to keep inflation low 
relative to the world domestic economies. At the end of 2010, the country 
closed the year with % inflation according to the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
However, the international demand of lithium can undermine Bolivia’s 
success and push inflation upward, hurting the poorest in the nation. 
Venezuela, the world’s fifth largest exporter of oil, closed 2010 with one 
of the highest levels of inflation, which many trade economists would 
predict.
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An overvalued exchange rate can also severely undermine other export 
sectors. As mentioned earlier, a highly valued currency renders exports 
less competitive by making them more expensive relative to competing 
exports from countries that do not have overvalued currencies. Although 
lithium turns into a successful exportation, its demand can push up the 
boliviano’s value. An overvalued exchange rate has proved to have disastrous 
effects. During the final years of the convertibility (1991 to 2002), which 
entailed a one-on-one one-way peg of the Argentine peso with the US 
dollar, Argentina suffered severe economic problems in the form of high 
unemployment, weak export-led growth, and imbalances in the country’s 
current account, leading to dire economic consequences (Ripley 2010b).
DEPENDENCY
Another caveat is dependency. With the inevitable exportation of lithium, 
the Bolivian economy risks dependency on the resource. Scholars have 
written extensively on the inevitable economic problems of mono 
-agricultural and mineral production. El Salvador’s dependency on the 
exportation of indigo, a blue dye, is an often-cited example (Montgomery 
1982; Burns 1984). After a synthetic dye was created in Germany, the 
crop was no longer exportable or, therefore, profitable. This type of 
dependency is particularly important for current Bolivian policy makers 
to avoid. The country’s economy previously suffered from dependency 
on tin and other resources. Throughout Bolivia’s history, it has experienced 
booms and busts in commodity prices. The Bolivian economy was heavily 
dependent on its prime community, tin. For decades in the last century, 
tin revenues were responsible for roughly 70% of Bolivia’s exports (“Tin 
Soldiers” 1999). However, when the world price of tin halved overnight, 
the economy went virtually bankrupt. By May of 1986, the price fell 
from $8,000 per ton to $3,400 (Ibid). 
Although one would think we have learned our lessons on commodity 
dependency, a large number of world economies remain dependent on 
primary commodities. Venezuela, another Andean country, still remains 
heavily dependent on oil revenues despite efforts to diversify the economy. 
Oil is still responsible for 80% of Venezuela’s export revenue, one third 
of its gross domestic product (GDP), and nearly half the investment 
of the central government (Alvarez and Hanson 2009). If Bolivia aims 
to be the “Saudi Arabia” of lithium, it runs the real risk of continuing 
its commodity dependency. 
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DEMOCRACY
Finally, in addition to dependency, the resource curse could undermine 
democratic rule. Essentially, the inflow of capital from the exportation 
of natural resources can be used to buy off governmental bureaucrats 
and chip away at democratic institutions. The resource curse has been 
applied to explain the sustenance of some of the world’s most brutal 
dictators such as Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha, who was able 
to maintain power through authoritarian rule, but also embezzle roughly 
$3 billion from public coffers (“National Integrity” 2004). However, the 
resource curse, studies have found, can be controlled and turned into 
benefits. Robinson et al. (2006) find that the key to avoiding this curse 
lies in strong institutions. They find that countries with institutions that 
create political competence, efficiency, and accountability are more likely 
to benefit from resource exportation than those countries that do not. 
This point is of particular relevance not only for the above mentioned 
emphasis on institutional building, but also the rising Latin American 
left. Bolivian President Evo Morales could increase his popularity with 
the benefits from lithium, helping the pink revolutions that are taking 
place in the hemisphere. However, since Bolivia does not rely on strong 
institutions, defined as promoting transparency, accountability, and 
competence, there could be a temptation to use the influx of new capital 
to undermine democratic rule. Latin America has suffered from this tendency 
recently, with a number of leftist governments, specifically Daniel Ortega 
in Nicaragua and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, changing the national 
constitutions and running indefinitely in future elections, reversing the 
one-only-term laws. Although analyzing the elections and popularity of 
these leftist leaders is beyond the scope of this paper, the tendency of 
leaders in developing and impoverished countries to take on a messianic 
leadership role and becoming “president for life” still remains a potential 
problem. Scholars need to further explore this political phenomenon in 
the future.
BENEFITTING FROM LITHIUM DEVELOPMENT: 
INSTITUTIONS
Despite the caveats related to lithium development, with the right policies, 
Bolivia can benefit. To begin with, the government can draw upon lessons 
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from other Latin American countries. The first lesson concerns domestic 
institutions. The Bolivian federal government needs to strengthen its 
institutional capacity. Studies on developing countries suggest that weak 
institutional oversight can lead to increased corruption and decreased 
efficiency (Vertucio and Lalunio 2001; Ripley 2010a). After creating the 
Commission on Audit, however, the Philippines government improved 
its oversight over financial transactions, increasing efficiency and decreasing 
corruption (Gonzalez and Mendoza 2004). Under the Cooper Department, 
neighboring Chile also invested in regulatory oversight to monitor the 
flow of investment and copper in order to discourage corruption. Bolivia 
needs to increase its institutional capacity in order to monitor the flow 
of capital into lithium production. Studies do suggest that YPFB has 
suffered from various forms of corruption, before as well as after 
nationalization (“Ex titular de YPFB” 2009). In fact, corruption and the 
lack of oversight was a principle reason President Morales pushed for 
nationalization in the first place. Not addressing institutional capacity will 
create a vicious cycle of FDI corruption. 
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
Moreover, there must be an emphasis on investing in secondary operations 
in order to generate positive externalities. Positive externalities refer to 
the spin-off benefits of economic activities. For example, technological 
development has potential positive externalities: spin-off industries; 
investment in higher education and technological skills; complementary 
production; and increased purchasing power due to the higher salaries 
high-tech jobs generate. With the exportation of cooper, Chile invested 
in spin-off industries such as electrolytic refining. This is important because 
refineries create jobs, require educated workers, and rely on research and 
development (R&D). Positive externalities that stem from refineries and 
other related industries, it is imperative to note, cannot not be 
underestimated. A small refinery, named Coryton, in Essex, Great Britain, 
for instance, creates over one thousand direct positions, not including 
indirect employment. What is more, many positions require well-paying 
skilled labor, such as chemical engineers (“Inside an Industry” 2006).
The lack of positive externalities, on the other hand, can have disastrous 
economic and social effects. Nigeria epitomizes this problem. Being the 
largest oil-producing country in Africa, one would think Nigeria would 
benefit economically. Ironically the country has not. Due to a lack of 
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refinery capabilities and oil-related infrastructure, Nigeria is doomed to 
export only crude oil. This means that it not only has to import the 
expensive processed oil, but the country does not benefit from high-paying 
jobs, spin-off industries, among other positive externalities. “Lack of refining 
capacity is a major obstacle to lowering fuel prices”, writes Dino Mahtani, 
“something that many in oil-rich Nigeria find objectionable”. In fact, 
in addition to having to subsidize gas for domestic consumers, Nigeria 
found itself in a state of chaos when oil prices began to increase in 
2003, causing long lines at gas stations throughout the country (Peel 
2003). 
Bolivia does not want to go in this direction. With natural gas, Bolivia 
has not reaped many positive externalities. The development of lithium, 
however, could be different. This is recognized by Alvaro Ríos Roca, 
former Bolivian Minister of Hydrocarbons. “In contrast with natural gas, 
if Bolivia plans its objectives well, it will be possible to develop a chain 
of added valor”, Roca (2009) stressed in an interview with Nicaragua’s 
principal economic journal El Observador, “that allows us to not only 
extract lithium as a primary material, but also generate a chain of value 
that designs and produces car batteries, cellular phones, etc., etc. en Bolivian 
soil”. With the aforementioned technological support by South Korean 
experts, Bolivia can develop a chain of added valor. In fact, the National 
Bureau of Evaporative Resources (GNRE), a Bolivian agency created 
to facilitate the infrastructural and processing development of the country’s 
mineral wealth, is strongly involved in overseeing not only the education 
of the country’s engineers, chemists, and technicians, but also the local 
industrial development to process the raw materials within Bolivia.4 
Although this is a step in the right direction, in order to extract the 
most benefit from lithium, the country must resist any temptations or 
incentives to process raw materials in second or third countries that already 
have the educational, infrastructural, and technological capacities. 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Moreover, the Bolivian government needs to create an efficient Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF). A SWF is essentially a governmental fund that manages 
foreign exchange earnings that are independent from foreign reserves. 
 4 For the GNRE’s projects and involvement, see its website at: http://www.evaporiticos. 
gob.bo/?page_id=124. 
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They have grown in capital, market influence, geographical scope, and 
use in the last decades. With portfolios worth trillions of dollars, the 
International Monetary Fund (2008) estimates that by 2013, SWF’ capital 
could reach anywhere between $6 and $10 trillion. Governments can 
funnel this capital, the IMF (2008) further points out, into five different 
types of funds: Pension reserves, developmental funds, reserve investment 
corporations, savings funds, and stabilization funds. Regardless of their 
specific use, SWFs have become an instrumental source of revenue and 
policy upon which governments in developing countries have relied. “[T]he 
growth of SWFs reflects a dramatic redistribution of international wealth 
from traditional industrial countries like the United States”, points out 
Edwin Truman (2008), economist for the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, “to countries that historically have not been major players 
in international finance” (3). 
For the specific case of Bolivia and Latin America in general, it is 
important to stress that a SWF has a particular strategy, usually related 
to long-term planning and growth. Chile, for example, counts on the 
Copper Stabilization Fund for counter-cyclical policies. Created in 1985, 
the goal of the fund is to implement Keynesian economic policies by 
injecting the economy with capital in order to compensate for market 
failures or a decrease in international commodity prices. Chile also relies 
on the Pension Reserve Fund, which was created in 2006 for retirees.5 
Venezuela has recently created the National Development Fund for 
development projects and even Alaska relies on the Alaska Permanent 
Fund, which was created as far back as 1976. The fund has become 
so instrumental for the state’s economy that politicians wrote it into the 
state constitution. 
Although Bolivia has no such entity currently, a SWF could be a vital 
policy tool for the government. A SWF can assist governments in a 
number of creative ways, depending on the specific need of the time. 
Albeit with the growth of SWFs economists have tried to measure their 
successes and efficiencies (see Truman 2008), policies are contingent on 
particular needs given a country’s specific domestic issues of a particular 
time. For example, a country with low inflation yet high unemployment 
and underemployment would want an expansionary policy whereas a country 
suffering from hyperinflation would not. For Bolivia, addressing the uneven 
 5 It is important to note that the Cooper Stabilization Fund was replaced with the Economic 
and Social Responsibility Fund in 2007. For more, see “Pension Reserve and Social 
and Economic Stabilization Fund” (2009) at http://www.hacienda.gov.cl/english/fondos 
_soberanos/fondo_de_estabilizacion_economica_y_social.php. 
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development between the rich Bolivians in the provincial capitals, particularly 
Santa Cruz, and the impoverished areas, most of which are populated 
by Bolivians of indigenous descent, would be a consideration. Unlike 
other countries with SWFs, Bolivia has a significant, often marginalized, 
population of indigenous citizens. A SWF could address the historical 
economic and social disparities they endure by investing in education, 
infrastructure, and local production. In fact, a SFW could be utilized 
as a low-income development bank for local businesses. Based on the 
model laid out by the Grameen Bank, a SWF could offer technological 
support and micro financing to those who have historically been isolated 
from the Bolivian social and economic power structures.6 A SWF can 
also help the country to achieve more economic independence from 
international economic institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, 
on which many developing countries rely for external funding. 
Most importantly, a SWF can help undermine the effects that stem 
from Dutch disease. If the foreign and local investment end up funneled 
into lithium production, the SWF can rely upon revenues from the 
exportation of lithium-related products to support alternative industries 
and economic development strategies. There would be revenue for, say, 
agricultural production in the rural countryside and small-business 
development in the urban areas throughout the country. By supporting 
economic sectors outside of lithium development, this policy could also 
help resist the risk of dependency by diversifying the economy. What 
is more, a SWF can help decrease the value of the Bolivian currency 
in case lithium exportation causes distorted exchange rates in the form 
of currency appreciation. Hard local currency can be used to sterilize 
the economy by expanding the nation’s money supply. This helps to 
devalue the local currency by decreasing its demand. Although many of 
the sovereign wealth fund policies mentioned above can have both positive 
and negative affects (for example, expanding the money supply can lead 
to inflation), SWFs will increase the amount of economic developmental 
tools Bolivian policy makers have at their disposal. These policy tools 
will help extract the optimal benefits from the vast lithium reserves. 
NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE
The ability to benefit from lithium also depends on the government’s 
 6 For an in-depth understanding of the Grameen Bank, see http://www.grameenfoundation. 
org/what-we-do. 
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leverage in negotiating favorable contracts. Bolivia does have certain 
advantages. First, the government has the opportunity to create competition 
among firms, which it may use as leverage to secure more favorable 
terms, as suggested by Jagdish Bhagwati (2007). There are signs that 
this may be the case in the government’s decision to enter agreements 
with South Korea. The Korean government has already offered low-interest 
40-year loans to the country at 0.1% interest with a 5-year grace period 
(“Cuatro puentes” 2010). These conditions are much more favorable than 
those offered in the international capital markets. More importantly, Bolivia 
appears to have a significant advantage in the negotiating process that 
is not emphasized in traditional or two-tier bargaining theory literature. 
The former emphasizes certain variables and potential benefits involved 
in the negotiation of a multinational corporation’s (MNC) entry into a 
developing country, such as technological transference, job creation, and 
even the confidence of U.S.-educated elites in negotiating better deals 
with MNCs, whereas the latter stresses the role and regulation of outside 
entities such as the IMF and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Ramamurti 
2001). These models, however, are inattentive to resource scarcity and 
the relatively new demands of center-left governments, such as the one 
in Bolivia, to earn more royalties from their precious resources. Lithium 
is not only a scarce and demanded resource, but Bolivia also contains 
more than half the world’s deposits. This means the country should use 
this leverage over MNCs and other interested parties. 
One significant and beneficial way to utilize the country’s leverage is 
reversing the repatriation of funds and free flow of capital. Trade agreements 
such as the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) include these provisions, which 
stipulate that a multi-national corporation can repatriate profits back to 
the country of origin without investing in the host country. Although 
pro-globalization enthusiasts such as Jagdish Bagwhati and John 
Williamsons, the latter who coined the term “Washington Consensus”, 
have protested against the free flow of capital, these policies have become 
prevalent in North-South economic relations. Center-left governments, 
however, have leveraged their resources to negotiate more favorable deals. 
The Venezuelan government has successfully negotiated a deal with 
Vancouver-based mining company Rusoro for the exploitation of gold 
and diamonds in the state of Bolivar. Not only does the government 
gain a sizable share at 50%, but the company is required to invest in 
the local communities and projects.7 
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CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to offer an exploratory study into the 
development and exportation of Bolivian lithium reserves. Although it 
is too early to offer predictions, this paper provides an overview of important 
areas that need exploration. More specifically, it endeavors to address: 
1) the specific challenges Bolivia as an individual faces; 2) the potential 
pitfalls lithium development can cause in the country’s economic and 
political institutions; and, most importantly, 3) specific policies Bolivia 
can undertake in order to successfully meet these challenges and avoid 
the potential problems lithium development may incur. The contribution 
here, therefore, is to offer prescriptive guidelines future academic and 
policy research can focus upon and measure once large-scale production 
gets underway. Moreover, this study aims to initiate a dialogue not only 
with students of Latin American studies, but also policy makers in both 
Bolivia and South Korea. Bolivia can benefit from its natural resources 
and Korean investment just as easily as it could incur irreparable harm 
and damage. The main points laid out above in this paper are crucial 
for initiating concrete developmental plans for the future use of one 
of the most potentially sought after resources in the world.
 7 For updated information, see the Rusoro website which is dedicated to mining in Venezuela. 
http://www.rusoro.com/s/Home.asp
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